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ABSTRACT
Situations in which there is uncertainty
over the cause of harm are studied (e.g., was the lung
cancer due to normal exposure to medical x-radiation, to
smoking, to exposure to carcinogens discharged by a chemical
plant?); and the effects on incentives to reduce risk of
various ways of treating such uncertainty under the liability
system are identified using a theoretical model of the
occurrence of harm. The main points are these. Use of a
threshold probabilit' of causation (e.g., 50%) as a criterion
for determining liability may adversely affect behavior:
parties might face a diminished burden of liability (if
their probability of causation systematically fell below the
threshold) and thus do too little to reduce risk; or they
might face an extra burden (if their probability were sys-
tematically above the threshold), and thus do too much.
Second, the best all or nothing criterion for determining
liability (a critPTon under which a party is fully liable
if at all liable) is different in form from a threshold
probability criterion. Third, liability in proportion to
the probability of causation is superior to all other cri-
teria and results in socially ideal behavior.
These points are demonstrated and analyzed in two types
of case: where the uncertainty involves a party versus
natural or "background" factors; and where it involves which
party among several was the author of harm. The importance
of the points is shown to depend on the type of case, and as
well on the form of liability (strict liability or the
negligence rule).
The interpretation of the analysis and important quali-
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What is the importance to the working of the liability
system of the possibility of uncertainty over the cause of
accidents?' What is the importance, for example, of the
possibility that it will not be known which of two hunters
fired the shot that struck another; that it will not be
clear whether the carcinogenic substance discharged from a
chemical plant or normal exposure to medical x-radiation and
other risks caused an individual's lung cancer; that it will
not be easy to say whether a surgeon's careless use of a
medical instrument, a nurse's mishandling of it, or a defect
in its manufacture was responsible for a patient's injury?
The present article will employ a theoretical model of
the occurrence of accidents and of the effect of liability
on behavior to study such questions. It will be assumed for
simplicity in this model that parties act solely in their
financial self-interest. Moreover, because the chief concern
will be with the desirability of the incentives created to
reduce accident risks, it will be supposed that the measure
of social welfare depends only on the value of engaging in
risky activities, on accident losses, and on prevention
costs22
The conclusions reached in the model derive inessence
from the familiar notion that for parties to be led to
reduce accident risks appropriately, they shouldgenerally
face probability-discounted or Iexpected12a liabilityequal
to the increase in expected losses that they create. (This,
of course, is naturally the case in the absence of the
chance of uncertainty over causation, for parties then face
liability if and only if they cause losses.) The conclusions
that will be obtained may be summarized by three statements.
(i) The use of a threshold probability as a criterion
for the determination of liability in cases where causation
is ambiguous has potentially adverse effects on behavior.
(According to this criterion, only if the probability that a
party caused an accident exceeds the threshold will the
relevant liability rule be applied; the usual more-probable-
than-not test3 thus involves a threshold of 50%.) Underany
threshold probability, two types of problemmay arise. On
the one hand, a party's probability of causation in ambiguous
cases might be systematically less than the threshold, with
the result that he would escape liability in suchcases,
that is, face a diminished burden of liability, and thus
might be inappropriately led to engage in risky activity or
might fail to take desirable steps to reduce risk. On the
other hand, a party's probability of causation in ambiguous
cases might systematically exceed the threshold, meaning
that he would always face liability in such cases, creating,3
in other words, an extra burden of liability, and thus the
opposite difficulties.
(ii) The best all-or-nothing criterion for determina-
tion of liability is different in form from a threshold
probability criterion. (An all-or-nothing criterion is any
criterion for deciding whether the relevant liability rule
shall be applied which preserves the usual feature of lia-
bility--that a liable party must pay damages fully equal to
the injured partys losses. A threshold probability is thus
an example of an all-or-nothing criterion.) The best all-or-
nothing criterion takes into implicit account not only the
probability of causation but also the magnitude of losses
and the effect of liability on deterrence.3a The criterion,
however, does suffer from the same two types of defect as
the threshold probability criterion (though to a lesser
degree).
(iii) Liability in proportion to the probability of
causation would be superior to the best all-or-nothing
criterion and, thus, in particular, to any threshold proba-
bility criterion. (According to the proportional approach,
the relevant rule of liability will always be applied, but
the measure of damages will be set equal to the harm done
multiplied by the probability that the liable party caused
the harm.) Indeed, use of the proportional approach eliminates
in the model all problems due to uncertainty over causation;
it results in parties' facing expected liability equal to
the expected losses they impose and thus it leads to socially
desirable behavior.3b4
These points will be developed in two types of situation.
In Part I of the article, the attention will be with situa-
tions where the uncertainty is whether the harm was caused
by a party or by natural or "background" factors (the chemical
plant vs. normal exposure to medical x-radiation and the
like). And in Part II, the interest will be with situations
where the uncertainty involves which party among several was
the author of harm (one hunter vs. another, the surgeon vs.
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willalso be with whether the parties act independently or
in concert. Significant differences will be shown to exist
in the importance of the three main points in Parts I and II
depending on the form of liability (either strict liability
or the negligence rule).3C
The article will conclude first with comments on the
positive interpretation of the analysis--attempting to
explain why a fixed threshold probability test has in fact
been employed, subject only to certain exceptions. Then
brief remarks will be made on the normative implications of
the analysis--noting situations in which proportional lia-
bility may have appeal (chiefly, where the likelihood of
uncertainty over causation is substantial, as in the area of
many environmental and health related risks), and reflecting
on the relevance of normative criteria that are not considered
in the analysis (administrative costs, compensation of vic-
tims, fairness, costs of error) .Following this will be an
appendix formally stating and proving the claims of the text.5
I.Uncertainty Over Causation: Party versus Natural Agent
Suppose that if and only if a party engages in a risky
activity might he cause accidents, that a natural agent will
cause accidents with some (fixed) probability4 regardless of
whether the party engages in the activity, and that accidents
will never be caused by both the party and the natural
agent.5
Additionally, assume that if the party engages in the
activity, accidents might be correctly identified as due to
him or as due to the natural agent; but they might also be
seen as of ambiguous origin, in which case the probability
that the party caused the accident will be determined. If
the party does not engage in the activity, assume that all
accidents will be correctly identified as due to the natural
agent.
With regard to the legal system, assume that if an
accident is known to be due to the party, a liability rule
will be applied in the usual way; that if the accident is
known not to be due to the party, he shall of course not be
liable; that in ambiguous cases, either some (all-or-nothing)
criterion will be used to decide whether the liability rule
will apply, or else the liability rule will definitely apply
but with the measure of damages being computed in proportion
to the party's probability of causation.
Further, suppose that the party acts to maximize his
expected position, namely, the value or benefit to him of
engaging in his activity (should he do so), less the cost of
care (should he take care), and less his expected liability.6
Finally, assume that social welfare is measured by the
value to the party of engaging in his activity, less any
cost of care, and less expected accident losses (comprised
of losses caused by the party and those caused by the natural
agent).
Let us now proceed to the analysis, examining first a
"basic" model in which the party decides only whether to
engage in his activity, and then an "extended" model in
which he decides also whether to take care. The reason for
studying both models is that while the main points are most
easily seen from the basic model, important insights are
gained by examining the more realistic version of the model
in which care is a variable (in part, because only then can
the negligence rule be analyzed).
A.Basic model: party decides only whether to engage
in his activity.
In this version of the model, socially desirable behavior
is easily described: the party ought to engage in the risky
activity if and only if his benefits would exceed the increment
he would cause in expected accident losses.
Example 1. The loss due to an accident would be 1,000;
the risk of accidents due to the natural agent is 10%;
the additional risk were the party to engage in his
activity would be 30%. As the expected accident losses
due to the party's engaging in his activity would be
300 (that is, 30% x 1000), it is socially desirable for
him to engage in it if and only if his benefits would
exceed 300. (Notice that the expected losses of 100
(that is, 10% x 1000) caused by the natural agent do
not affect the6desirability of the party's engaging in
his activity.)7
Let us now examine how the party would actually behave
under the various approaches to treatment of uncertainty
over causation, assuming liability to bestrict.7
threshold probability criterion. Because the party
will be liable for losses in ambiguous cases under this
criterion when and only when his probability of causation
exceeds the threshold, the two problems stated in the introduc-
tion will clearly arise. Consider first the possibility
that the party's probability of causation in ambiguous cases
would exceed the threshold.7a In this event, the party's
expected liability would indeed involve an extra burden, for
it would include a component of accident losses due to the
natural agent. Hence, the party might undesirably decide
against engaging in his activity; and that would be so if
his benefit would not exceed the increment in losses he
would cause but by more than the extra burden.
Example 2a. Suppose the situation to be as in the
previous example and suppose further that were the
party to engage in his activity, 2/3 of all accidents
caused by him and 1/2 of all accidents caused by the
natural agent would be seen as ambiguous. Then there
would be a 25% chance (that is, 2/3 x 30% +1/2x 10%)
of accidents of ambiguous origin; an 80% probability of
causation by the party in such accidents (for 20% is
the risk of an ambiguous accident truly caused by the
party, 5% is the risk of an ambiguous accident truly
caused by the natural agent, and 20%/(20% +5%)=80%);
a 10% chance (that is, 1/3 x 30%) of an accident known
to be due to the party; and a 5% chance (that is, 1/2 x
10%) of an accident known to be due to the natural
agent.
Thus, under, say, the more-probable-than not
criterion,8/ the party would be liable in ambiguous
cases. His expected liability would therefore be 350
(that is, (25% +10%)xl000).As 350 exceeds the expected
accident losses he causes of 300, his extra burden of
liability is 50. Hence, he might undesirably be discouraged
from engaging in the activity; and this would occur
when his benefits are between 300 and 350, that is,
greater than 300 but not by more than the extra burden.8
Now consider the possibility that the party's probability of
causation in ambiguous cases would fall below the threshold.
Because the party would then bear a reduced burden of expected
liability were he to engage in his activity, he might do so
when it is socially undesirable.
Example 2b. Suppose instead that only 1/5 of accidents
caused by the party but 3/4 of accidents caused by the
natural agent would be seen as ambiguous. Then there
would be a 13.5% chance (that is, l/5x30% +3/4x10%)of
accidents of ambiguous origin; a 44.44% probability of
causation by the party in such accidents (for 6%/l3.5%
=44.44%);a 24% chance of an accident known to be
caused by the party; and a 2.5% chance of an accident
known to be due to the natural agent. Hence, under the
more—probable-than-not criterion, the party would not
be liable in ambiguous cases and his expected liability
would be only 240. As a result of this diminished
burden, the party might undesirably be led to engage in
his activity; and that would be so when his benefits
are between 240 and 300.
It should be clear from the logic of Examples 2a and 2b that
both types of problem can arise for any level of the probabil-
ity threshold between 0% and 100%; there is nothing special
about the more-probable-than-not threshold of 50%.
best all-or-nothing criterion. That this does not take
the form of a threshold probability criterion should be
clear on reflection. Given the probability of causation,
plainly it should matter what for instance are the party's
benefits, as this will determine whether the party would be
led to make an undesirable decision if he were or were
not held liable. Hence the best decision of the court must
depend on factors in addition to the probability of causation.
Example 3. Suppose the situation to be as described in
Example 2a, where, recall, the probability of causation
was 80%; expected losses truly caused by the party's
engaging in his activity were 300; and the party's9
expected liability would be 350 if he were held liable
in ambiguous cases but would be only 100 otherwise. In
this situation, an all-or-nothing determination about
liability in ambiguous cases may be seen as a decision
either to impose expected liability of 350 on the
party--by holding him responsible in ambiguous cases--or
as a decision to impose expected liability of only 100
on him--by holding him responsible only in cases where
he is known to have caused harm.
What should the court do if it wishes to maximize
social welfare? What, in other words, is the best
all-or-nothing determination about liability? The
answer depends on (among other factors)9/ the court's
estimate of the benefits that parties like the one with
whom it is presented derive from engaging in their
activities. Suppose, for instance, that the estimate
is that most such parties would derive benefits between
300 and 350, and very few between 100 and 300. Then,
most parties would be undesirably discouraged from
engaging in their activities were there liability in
ambiguous cases, whereas few would be undesirably
encouraged to engage in their activities were there no
liability in ambiguous cases. Hence, the best decision
would be not to hold the given party liable in ambiguous
cases.
On the other hand, suppose the reverse to be the
case, that the estimate is that most parties like the
given one would enjoy benefits between 100 and 300, and
few between 300 and 350. Then analogous reasoning
leads to the conclusion that the best decision would be
to hold the party liable in ambiguous cases.
We have therefore shown that the socially desirable decision
whether to hold the party liable in ambiguous cases may
indeed depend on factors distinct from the probability of
causation. But note that even given this best decision,
there will still be some possibility of undesirably encouraging
engagement in the activity or of undesirably discouraging
it.1° This is because it is in the nature of the all-or-
nothing approach that parties will either bear an extra
burden of liability or a diminished one; they will never
bear a burden that equals the increment in losses that they
cause.10
proportional approach. If, however, liability in
ambiguous cases is made proportional to the party's probability
of causation, the fundamental difficulty of the all-or-nothing
approach that was just noted will be avoided. As is probably
clear on intuitive grounds, under the proportional approach
the party's expected liability will equal the increment in
expected losses that he causes. He will therefore choose to
engage in his activity precisely when his benefits are
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sociallydesirable circumstances.
Example 4. Consider again the situation described in
Example 2a. Then, as the probability of causation
would be 80% in ambiguous cases, the party's liability
under the proportional approach would be 800 (that is,
80%xl000) in such cases. His expected liability were
he to engage in the activity would thus be equal to the
sum of his expected liability from ambiguous cases, or
25%x800, and his expected liability from cases known to
be caused by him, or lO%xl000; the sum is evidently 200
+100=300,which is the expected accident losses that
he would cause.
Now suppose that the figures are altered as in
Example 2b, where, recall, there was a 24% chance of
accidents known to be caused by the party, a 13.5%
chance of accidents of ambiguous origin, and in such
cases a 44.44% probability of causation. Then, again,
the party's expected liability under the proportional
approach would equal 300 (that is, 13.5%x444.44 +24%
xl000 =60+240)were he to engage in his activity.
This example illustrates that under the proportional approach
the party's expected liability will equal expected losses
due to his activity regardless of what would be the magnitude
of his probability of causation."11
B.Extended model: party decides whether to engage
in his activity and, if so, whether to take care.
Assume now that if the party engages in his activity,
he may reduce the likelihood of an accident by taking care,
which will involve a cost to him. The party's exercise of
care will be socially desirable if the reduction in expected
accident losses it would accomplish would exceed its cost.
Moreover, whether his exercise of care would be desirable
will influence the desirability of the party's engaging in
his activity in the first place. Specifically, if his
exercise of care would be desirable, then the party's engaging
in his activity will be desirable if his benefits would
exceed the cost of care plus the (reduced level of) expected
accident losses; but if his exercise of care would not be
desirable, then his engaging in his activity will be desirable
only if his benefits would exceed the (initial level of)
expected accident losses.
Example 5. Modify Example 1 by assuming that if the
party engages in his activity and takes care, the risk
he causes will fall from 30% to 28%. Thus, care would
result in a reduction of 20 (that is, 2%xl000) in
expected accident losses, so that care ought to be
taken if its cost is less than 20. Thus, if the cost
of care is 10, it should be exercised if the party
engages in his activity; and the party ought to engage
in his activity in this case if his benefits would
exceed 10 +280=290.But if the cost of care is 25,
it should not be exercised by the party; and therefore
he ought to engage in his activity only if his benefits
would exceed 300.
With this example in mind, let us reexamine the legal treat-
ment of uncertainty over causation, first under strict12
liability and then under the negligence rule.(Asid in doing
so, let us focus attention on the decision about theexercise
of care given that the party chooses to engage in his activity,
for the latter choice generally may be understood from what
was said about it in the basic model.)
1. situation under strict liability
threshold probability criterion. Under this criterion,
the party's decision about care will be socially appropriate
if his probability of causation in ambiguous cases would
exceed the threshold whether or not he takes care. To see
why, notice that the party would then bear an extra burden
of liability whether or not he takes care; thus his savings
in expected liability from the exercise of care would equal
the reduction thereby accomplished in expected accident
losses; accordingly, and desirably, he will take care if and
only if its cost is less than the reduction in expected
accident losses.
Example 6a. Consider again the previous example where
care would reduce the risk of accidents from 30% to
28%; and suppose as in Example 2a, that 2/3 of accidents
caused by the party and 1/2 of accidents caused by the
natural agent would be seen as ambiguous. Then the
party's probability of causation in ambiguous cases
would be 80% if he does not take care and it would be
78.87% if he does.l2/ Hence, under the more probable-
than-not criterion, he would be liable in ambiguous
cases and bear an extra burden of liability of 50
whether or not he takes care. In consequence, his
expected liability will be 280 +50=330if he takes
care, 300 +50=350if he does not, so that he will
take care if and only if its cost is less than 20, the
desirable result.
It should be clear, however, that the desirability of the
decision over care here illustrated would not hold if the13
party's probability of causation might not exceed the threshold.
In this regard, there are two possibilities. One is that
the party's probability of causation would not exceed the
threshold if he takes care--so he would bear only a diminished
burden of liability--but his probability of causation would
exceed the threshold if he fails to take care--so he would
bear an extra burden. In this event, the party's savings in
expected liability from taking care would be greater than
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for the party's savings would equal not only the decline in
expected accident losses but also avoidance of the extra
burden and the "gain" of the diminished burden. Hence, the
party might take care when that would not be desirable.
Example 6b. Suppose that by the exercise of care, the
party would reduce the risk of accidents from 30% to
6%. Then while if he does not take care, his probability
of causation in ambiguous cases would be 80%, if he
takes care it will be only 44.44%,13/ which is below
the 50% threshold. As a consequence, although if he
does not take care, the party's expected liability will
be 350, if he takes care, it will be only 60 -40=20.
Hence, his liability savings from taking care would
equal 350 -20=330,whereas the savings in expected
accident losses are only 300 -60=240.(The party's
liability savings exceed society's savings in accident
losses by 330 -240=90because by taking care, he
avoids the extra burden of 50 and also enjoys a reduced
burden of 40 on account of escaping liability in the
ambiguous cases truly caused by him.) It follows that
the party might be undesirably led to take care; and
this would happen when the cost of care exceeds 240 but
is less than 330.
By contrast, the other possibility of interest leads to too
little incentive to take care. If the party's probability
of causation would be less than the threshold whether or not
he takes care, then he would escape liability in ambiguous14
cases whether or not he takes care. He would therefore not
derive any savings in liability from a care-related decline
in ambiguous cases truly caused by him; his savings in
expected liability from taking care would be less than the
decline in expected accident losses. Thus, he might fail to
take care when he ought.
Example 6c. Suppose that the situation is more or less
the reverse of that in the preceding example; suppose
now that the risk caused by the natural agent is 30%;
that the risk caused by the party is 10%; that he can
reduce the risk from 10% to 8% by the exercise of care;
and that 1/2 of accidents caused by him and 2/3 of
those caused by the natural agent would be seen as
ambiguous. Then as the party's probability of causation
in ambiguous cases would be below the 50% threshold
whether or not he takes care--namely, 20% if he does
not take care and 16.66% if he does--he would never be
liable in such cases. Hence, if he does not take care,
his expected liability would be 100 -50=50,and if
he does take care, it would be 80 -4040. His
liability savings from taking care would thus be 50 -
4010, namely, only half the true reduction of 100 —
80=20in expected accident losses accomplished by
taking care. In consequence, the party might not take
care when he ought; and this will be the case whenever
the cost of care is greater than 10 but less than 20.
14 This completes the analysis of the incentive to take care.
To recapitulate, the incentive to take care will be inadequate
if the probability of causation would be less than the
threshold regardless of the exercise of care; the incentive
will be excessive if the probability of causation would be
less than the threshold only if care were taken; but the
incentive will be appropriate if the probability of causation
would always exceed the threshold.
best all-or-nothing criterion. Once again, this will
generally be different from a threshold probability criterion,
as should be apparent from the logic of the argument given15
earlier. (Note, however, that the best all-or-nothing
criterion should be more complicated than earlier, as it now
will implicitly take into account the effect of liability on
the decision whether to take care as well as on whether to
engage in the activity.)
proportional approach. Under the proportional approach,
the party will make the appropriate decisions about the
exercise of care and engagement in the risky activity. As
explained before, under this approach the party's expected
liability will equal the expected accident losses he causes;
hence the reduction in liability that he will derive from
the exercise of care will equal the reduction in accident
losses thereby accomplished; he will therefore take care
when that would be desirable, and so forth.
Example 7. Consider again the situation of Example 6c,
where the party might not have taken care when he ought
under the more-probable-than-not criterion, and suppose
that proportional liability is imposed in ambiguous
cases. Then if the party engages in his activity and
does not take care, his probability of causation in
ambiguous cases will be 20% and his expected liability,
100 (that is, 25%x200 +5%xl000);and if the party does
take care, his probability of causation will be 16.66%
and his expected liability, 80 (that is, 24%x166.6 +
4%xl000).Thus the party will take care if and only if
its cost is less than the savings of 100 -80=20in
expected liability costs; as this equals the savings in
expected accident losses, his decision about care will
indeed be socially desirable.
2. situation under the negligence rule
By definition of the negligence rule, the party will be
held liable for losses in an accident that he caused if he
failed to take "due care"; otherwise he will not be liable.16
Assume here that due care is determined in a socially ideal
manner by the courts: There is a duty to take care if and
only if the cost of care is less than the savings in expected
accident losses in which care would result. Assume also
that care is accurately perceived by the courts, and thus
that there will be no possibility of legal mistake about
this element of a case.
Before proceeding to the analysis, recall the fundamental
fact that under the negligence rule, the party's motive to
engage in his activity may be too great, quite apart from
any problems due to uncertainty over causation. The reason
that the party might engage in his activity when he ought
not is simply that if he takes due care, he will escape
liability for any accidents that he causes. This means that
he will see as the cost of engaging in his activity merely
the cost of exercising due care--rather than the higher and
true social cost equal to the cost of due care plus the
expected accident losses caused by his activity)5
Example 8. Consider the situation where the risk of
accident losses caused by the party would be 30% if he
does not take care and 28% if he does; where the cost
of care is 10; but where there is no possibility of
uncertainty over causation. Then, as the exercise of
care would be socially worthwhile, the party would have
to take care to avoid being found negligent. And,
clearly, if the party were to engage in his activity,
he would decide to take care: if he did so, his only
costs would be 10, the cost of care; but if he did not,
his expected liability would equal 300. As a consequence,
although the party would, desirably, be induced to take
care if were to engage in his activity, he would decide
to engage in it whenever his benefits would exceed 10.
But it would be desirable that he engage in his activity
only when his benefits would exceed 10 +280=290.17
It turns out that this problem of socially excessive
incentives to engage in risky activity may be exacerbated by
the possibility of uncertainty over causation. Suppose that
the party inappropriately fails to take due care because he
will not be liable in ambiguously caused cases. Then, ipso
facto, his expected liability must be less than the cost of
care; and hence the problem of his having an excessive
incentive to engage in the activity must be worsened)-6
Having now stated the (only) point of interest about
uncertainty over causation and the decision to engage in the
activity under the negligence rule, let us examine the
decision to take care.
threshold probability criterion. Under this criterion,
the party will never have too great an incentive to take
care. Although he might be subject to liability "too often"--
because his probability of causation might always exceed the
threshold--he may avoid liability by taking due care; being
subject to liability for negligence too often does not mean
that the party pays too much in damages; it means only that
he has a specially strong motive to take due care.
However, the party might have too little incentive to
take care. This possibility may arise when the party's
probability of causation in ambiguous cases would be below
the threshold, for then he would be subject to liability
for negligence too infrequently.
Example 9.Suppose that the risk due to the natural
agent is 30%; that the risk caused by the party if he
engages in his activity and does not take care is 3%;
that the party can reduce the risk to 1% by taking18
care; that the cost of care is 18; and that 1/2 of all
accidents caused by the party and 2/3 of those caused
the natural agent would be seen as of ambiguous origin.
Then the party's probability of causation would be
below the threshold whether or not he takes care--it
would be 6.98% if he does not take care and 2.44% if he
does; and the risk of an accident for which he would be
known to be the cause would be 1.5% (that is, 1/2 x 3%)
if he does not take care. Hence, if he does not take
care, his expected liability for negligence will be 15;
if he takes care, although he will never be found
liable, he will have borne a cost of 18 in so doing;
accordingly, he will not take care. Thus, despite the
social desirability of spending 18 on care to reduce
expected accident losses by 20 =30-10,the party will
not do so. The difficulty is that the party is subject
to liability only half as often as he ought to be.
This problem of failure to take care will arise only if the
probability of escaping liability for negligence is quite
high, that is, only if the likelihood of ambiguous cases is
high relative to the total risk created. This is because
the underlying incentive to take due care is strong under
the negligence rule; for by taking due care, one avoids
liability entirely (rather than--as under strict liability--
merely lowering its expected magnitude).17
best all-or-nothing criterion. As stated before, this
criterion is superior to, different from, and more complicated
than any threshold probability criterion.
proportional approach. Under this approach, as should
be clear from what was said before, a negligent party's
expected liability would equal the expected accident losses
he causes. Hence if the party engages in his activity, he
will be led to take due care.
Example 10. Suppose in Example 9 that proportional
liability is imposed for negligence in ambiguous cases.
Then if the party does not take care, as his probability
of causation will be 6.98%, his expected liability will19
be 30 (that is, 21.5%x69.8+1.5%xl000). And since he
can avoid this liability by taking care at a cost of
18, he will do so (in contrast to what he was led to do
in Example 9).
The situation under the proportional scheme, evidently, is
therefore exactly that which would obtain were there no
possibility of uncertainty over causation; there will always
be an appropriate incentive to take due care (and there will
be an equivalent problem of excessive incentives to engage
in the activity).20
II. Uncertainty Over Causation: Which of Several Parties
Was The Author of Harm
Assume as in the previous part that each party may
decide to engage in a risky activity;18 that accidents are
always caused by some single party among those engaging in
risky activities; that this responsible party might be
identifiable to the courts; but, if not, that the accident
will be seen as of ambiguous origin, in which case the
probability of causation of each party will be determined.
With regard to the legal system, make the same assumptions
as before, adding only that in cases of ambiguous causation
where more than one party is held liable, damages might be
apportioned in some way)9
Also, continue to assume that the behavior of each
party is determined by maximization of his expected position,
and consider both the assumption that parties act independently
and that they act in concert. Under the first assumption,
we will determine a so-called equilibrium, a situation such
that no party has reason to alter his behavior, assuming
that other parties will continue to act as they have been.
And under the assumption that parties act in concert, we
will determine their jointly preferred position, that which
maximizes the sum of their expected positions.2°
Finally, assume the measure of social welfare to be
much as before, namely, the sum (over all parties) of the
value of engaging in activities, less the sum of any costs
of care, and less expected accident losses.21
We consider first the basic model and then the version
of the model with care a decision variable. The numerical
examples illustrating the results will be limited to the
situation where there are just two parties involved, the
extension to the situation with more than two parties usually
being obvious.
A.Basic model: prties decide only whether to engage
in their activities.
In this case, socially ideal behavior is of course for
a party to engage in his activity if and only if the benefits
he would derive exceed the increment he would cause in
accident losses over what others cause (rather than, as
before, over what was attributable to the natural agent).
Example 11. Modify Example 1 by supposing that a party
A would create a 30% risk of accidents and another
party B (rather than a natural agent) would create a
10% risk of accidents. Then A ought to engage in the
activity if his benefits would exceed 300, and B if his
benefits would exceed 100.
Now let us examine the behavior of parties assuming
liability to be strict.
threshold probability criterion. Suppose initially
that parties act independently. Then the two problems
identified in part I generally arise: First, certain parties
might undesirably fail to engage in their activities; for
were they to engage in their activities, they might find
themselves bearing an extra burden of liability due to their
liability for accident losses of ambiguous origin.And
second, some parties might undesirably decide to engage in22
their activities; for were they to do so, they might bear
only a reduced burden of liability due to their escaping
liability in cases of ambiguous origin.
Example 12. Continuing with Example 11, and
assuming the more-probable-than-not criterion, let us
first show that a party might undesirably fail to
engage in his activity. Specifically, let us show that
A might fail to engage in his activity when he ought to
engage in it because by doing so he would become liable
in all ambiguous cases and thus bear liability for some
accidents caused by B. Suppose that 2/3 of accidents
caused by A and 1/2 of those caused by B would be seen
as of ambiguous origin if both engaged in their activities;
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andB's, 125. Then both parties ought to engage in
their activities, but only B would do so. To see why,
let us consider three candidates for an equilibrium
situation, namely, both A and B engaging in their
activities, A alone engaging in his activity, and B
alone doing so. If both engage in their activities,
then A will be liable for all ambiguous cases--for A's
probability of causation will be 80% and B's 20%; A's
liability will thus be 350 and B's will be 50; A's net
position will be 325—350=—25, and B's, 125-50=75; hence
A would withdraw, meaning that the situation could not
be an equilibrium. Similarly, if A alone engages in
his activity, B will decide to engage in his activity
as well, for as just observed, he would then enjoy net
benefits of 75; hence this situation too could not be
an equilibrium. However, B alone engaging in his
activity is an equilibrium situation, for he would
enjoy net benefits of 125-100=25; and A would not
decide to engage in his activity, for as observed, he
would lose 25 by doing so.
Let us now show that a party might undesirably
engage in his activity. If we alter the benefit figures
from above, we will find that both A and B will engage
in their activities when B ought not to; B will engage
in his activity only because he will avoid liability
for part of his accident losses by escaping liability
in ambiguous cases; he will ride on the coattails of A.
Specifically, let A's benefits be 400 and B's, 75.
Then while A ought to engage in his activity, B ought
not. Yet it is plain that each engaging in his activity
is an equilibrium, for each will derive positive net
benefits; A's will be 400-350=50, and B's will be
75-50=25. B engages in his activity because his liability
is 50 rather than the 100 in expected accident losses
that he causes.23
The relative importance of the two problems just illustrated
obviously depends on the size of the threshold probability
and on the number of potential participants in activities
that could cause accidents of ambiguous origin. We would
expect, for instance, that the importance of the problem of
undesirably encouraging engagement in activities would
increase as the number of potential participants rises and
also as the threshold rises, for each would conduce to the
possibility that any given partys probability of causation
would lie below the threshold.
How is what we have said about the threshold probability
criterion affected if we suppose that parties act in concert
rather than independently? Recall that when parties act in
concert, they will wish to maximize the sum of net benefits--
which here means that they will want a party to engage in
his activity if the benefits he would derive exceed any
increase in the sum of expected liabilities of the parties.
Now assume the situation to be such that whenever an
ambiguous case arises, some party (or parties) would be held
liable--because his probability of causation would exceed
the threshold. (This assumption will be relaxed below.)
Then the outcome when parties act in concert would be socially
ideal. The reason is simply that under the assumption just
made, the sum of parties' liabilities would necessarily
equal the stun of accident losses; hence the increase in the
sum of expected liabilities due to a party's engaging in his
activity would equal the increase in expected accident24
losses; in consequence, a party would be allowed by the
group acting in concert to engage in his activity precisely
when his benefits would exceed the increase in expected
accident losses he would cause.
Example 13. Let us verify that in the previous
example, an optimal outcome would result were A and B
to act in concert. (In that example, it was true that
either A or B would be liable for ambiguous cases, so
the assumption of present interest is satisfied.) When
A's and B's benefits were 325 and 125, respectively, it
was socially desirable that each engage in his activity.
And this is what they would now do. If each engages in
his activity, their joint expected position will be
(325—350) +(125—50)50;if A alone does so, their
joint position will be only 325-300=25; and if B alone
does so, it will also be 125-100=25; hence A and B will
indeed be best off each engaging in his activity.2l/
On the other hand, when A's and B's benefits were
400 and 75, it was socially desirable that A alone
engage in his activity, and this is what would occur
when the two parties act in concert. If each engages
in his activity, their joint position will be (400-350)
+(75-50)=75;if A alone engages in his activity, it
will be 400-300 =100;if B alone engages in his activity,
it will be 75-l00=-25; hence A alone will engage in his
activity. 22/
If we now alter the assumption that some party will be
liable in each ambiguous case, then the outcome when parties
act in concert may not be socially desirable; there will be
a potential problem of parties' undesirably engaging in
their activities. The reason in essence is that by engaging
in their activities, parties might introduce enough uncertainty
about ambiguous cases to make the probability of causation
of each fall below the threshold, allowing them all to escape
liability in such cases.
Example 14. A and B would each derive benefits of 75
from engaging in his activity; each would create a 10%
risk of accidents by so doing; were each to engage in
his activity, 1/2 of accidents caused by each would be
seen as of ambiguous origin--so that the probability of
causation of each would be 50%.25
In this situation, it would be best that neither A
nor B engage in his activity, as each would cause ex-
pected accident losses of 100. Yet by agreeing jointly
to engage in their activities, A and B would avoid half
their liability--each would bear expected liability of
only 50--for under the more-probable-than-not criterion,
neither would be held liable in ambiguous cases.
Hence, A and B would each derive net benefits of
75-50=25 and would, undesirably, engage in their
activities.
Note, however, that the opposite problem--of too little
engagement in activities--cannot arise because the sum of
expected liability costs surely will not increase by more
than the true addition to expected accident losses when a
party engages in his activity.
best all-or-nothing criterion. For now familiar reasons,
this criterion is different from and superior to a threshold
probability criterion. (It would, for example, take into
account whether parties acted in concert.)
proportional approach. This approach would again lead
to socially ideal behavior, whether parties act independently
or in concert. If the parties act independently, each would
clearly be led to engage in his activity if and only if his
benefits would exceed the expected accident losses he would
cause, for under the proportional approach each party's
expected liability would equal the expected accident losses
he would cause. Similarly, if the parties act in concert,
each would be led to engage in his activity exactly when
that would be desirable; for the fact that each party's
expected liability would equal his expected accident losses
means that the increment in the sum of expected liabilities
due to a party's engaging in his activity would equal the
expected accident losses he would cause.26
B.Extended model: parties decide whether to engage
in their activities and, if so, whether to take care.
The points of interest here can be explained without
further numerical examples and largely by reference to
previous discussion. (In any event, the situations to be
considered will often involve so many elements that numerical
examples would become too complicated to be helpful.)
1. situation under strict liability
We will discuss here only the decision to take care, as
the conclusions from the basic model about engagement in the
activities will carry over to the extended model.
threshold probability criterion. Suppose first that
parties act independently. Then the situation is as described
in part I. That is, a party might have an appropriate
incentive to take care; and this would be so if his probability
of causation would exceed the threshold whether or not he
takes care. On the other hand, a party might have an incorrect
incentive to take care: his incentive would be excessive if
his probability of causation would fall below the threshold
only if he takes care; and his incentive would be inadequate
if his probability of causation would fall below the threshold
whether or not he takes care.
Now suppose that parties act in concert. Then the
conclusions depend on the two possibilities discussed in the
basic model. The first, recall, was that some party (or
parties) would be liable for losses in each ambiguous case.
In this case, joint expected liability would equal actual27
joint expected accident losses; thus by logic similar to
that given in the basic model, parties' incentives to take
care would be socially ideal. The other possibility was
that parties' joint liability might be less than expected
accident losses since all might escape liability in ambiguous
cases. In this circumstance, parties' incentives to take
care would be inadequate, and some parties might fail to
take care when they ought to.
best all-or-nothing criterion. Again, this is more
complicated than and superior to a threshold probability
criterion.
proportional approach. Because this results in each
party's bearing the true expected accident losses he causes,
it leads to ideal incentives to take care as well as to
engage in risky activities, and regardless of whether parties
act independently or in concert.
2. situation under the negligence rule
We will again discuss only the decision to take care.
(Recall, however, that under the negligence rule there is an
underlying problem of too great an incentive to engage in
risky activities.)
threshold probability criterion. If the parties act
independently, then their motive to take care will be as
described in part I.Specifically, if a party's probability
of causation would exceed the threshold if he took care, his
motive to take care would be appropriate. But if his probabil-
ity of causation would be below the threshold if he took care,28
his incentive to take care would be inadequate, as his
expected liability for negligence would be too low.
Suppose, on the other hand, that parties act in concert.
Then if some party (or parties) would be liable fornegli-
gence in each ambiguous case, parties would always be induced
to take due care: as explained above, the joint potential
expected liability for negligence would then equal the
expected accident losses truly caused. But if all parties
might escape liability for negligence in ambiguouscases,
then some parties might not be induced to take duecare.
best all-or-nothing criterion. This is again different
from and superior to a threshold probability rule.
proportional approach. This results in the exercise of
due care in all circumstances, as expected liability for
negligence would equal expected accident losses caused.29
III. Concluding Comments
In closing, let us consider briefly (a) the positive
implications of the theoretical analysis--the consistency of
the results obtained with the actual determination of liability
in the face of uncertainty over causation; and (b) the
normative implications of the analysis--the recommendations
that are suggested by the results.
(a) On the issue of uncertainty over causation, the
general approach of the law has been to make a liable defendant
pay damages fully equal to any losses of which he was more-
probably-than-not the cause.23 For several reasons, this
fact--that the law employs an all-or-nothing approach to
liability based on a threshold probability--need not be seen
as inconsistent with the theoretical superiority in the
model of liability in proportion to the probability that the
defendant caused losses. Most obviously, one would hardly
expect as important an element of liability as its all-or-
nothing character to be abandoned in the face of this or
that aspect of a case, here in the face of uncertainty over
causation, unless there were strong reasons to do otherwise.
And no strong reasons to do otherwise appear to exist in
respect to the usual tort. In particular, one suspects that
the likelihood of real uncertainty over the cause of the
usual tort must be small,24 and thus so must be the chance
of any adverse behavioral consequences associated with the
all-or-nothing character of liability and use of a threshold
probability test.25 (Further, the fact that the negligence30
rule is the major form of tort liability supplies other if
subtle reasons for thinking that adverse effects on behavior
are likely to be small.)26 Additionally, there are considera-
tions going outside the model that appear to favor the usual
approach over the alternative of proportional liability: as
discussed below, the usual approach may result in fewer
cases and lower administrative costs than the proportional
and, further, be perceived as fair rather than unfair.
If, then, it seems understandable that liability has
retained its all-or—nothing character in the typical case
involving uncertainty over causation and that a threshold
probability criterion has been employed, what can be said
about the fact that the courts have occasionally chosen
explicitly to adjust the magnitude of the threshold from
50%?27 And what can be said about the view that this is
often done implicitly, according to the felt requirements of
policy and the nature of the case?27a The answer is that
altering the threshold probability may be interpreted as
reflecting the theoretical result that the best all-or-nothing
criterion cannot be expressed as a fixed threshold probability
criterion and that this best criterion generally depends on
many characteristics of the particular problem at hand.
At the same time, it seems consistent with theory that
in certain restricted types of case, the threshold requirement
has in effect been dropped and, recently, that use of the
proportional approach has been seriously considered and even
adopted. For instance, when it was unclear which hunter
fired the harmful shot, the court did not insist that the31
probability threshold requirement be met; instead it simply
shifted the burden of proof about causation to defendants.28
And where it was not ascertainable which company manufactured
the generic drug that caused cancer, the court found companies
liable according to their market share, that is, approximately
29,29a in proportion to the probability that they caused harm.
Such cases are distinguishable in the theoretically anticipated
way: they raise in a vivid manner the possibility that
there would be problematic effects associated with use of
the usual approach to the determination of liability;29b for
under the usual approach defendants would be allowed to go
free even though the court knows with high probability that
some one of them caused the harm. Indeed, this concern is
sometimes expressed in opinions.30
(b) The principal normative implications of the analysis
follow from what we have just said. They are two. First,
where little problem with adverse incentives would be expected
to result from use of the usual approach in determining
liability--that is, where the likelihood of uncertainty over
causation would be low--there will be no special reason for
change. Thus, surely, no change is recommended as a general
matter.
But, second, where significant undesirable effects on
behavior could result from use of the usual approach --
wherethe chance of uncertainty over causation would be
substantial --adoptionof some form of the proportional
approach may have appeal. Perhaps the area in which this- — — — -- .—- —w--'•___ — — —.——— —n----——.-----p .—-—-- _———_n_33
to be below the threshold, he will not be likely to initiate
legal action under the threshold criterion but may well
under the proportional approach.34 Second, the likelihood
that a suit would result in a trial would also seem to be
larger under the proportional approach. This is because use
of the proportional approach introduces as an additional
issue of possible dispute between the parties the actual
magnitude of the probability of causation. (Under the
threshold probability criterion, by contrast, the actual
magnitude of the probability will not be at issue except
with respect to the question whether the probability is
above or below the threshold. )35 And third, the cost of a
trial would as well seem greater under the proportional
approach. This appears so again because of the introduction
of the actual magnitude of the probability of causation
(beyond the threshold determination) as an additional issue
of potential dispute; because the jury too would now have to
decide about the actual magnitude of the probability of
causation; and because one would expect a greater number of
defendants to be involved in the typical dispute (the plaintiff
joining as defendants many of the parties who could conceivably
have done him harm). In sum, then, not just the volume of
disputes but also the probability that a dispute will result
in a trial and the cost per trial would seem greater under
the proportional approach.
With regard to the issue of compensation, the main
observations to be made are that when the probability of
causation does not exceed 50%, the proportional approach34
results in positive compensation and the usual approach
results in none; that when the probability of causation does
exceed 50%, the proportional approach results in less com-
pensation than the usual approach; and that the former
effect may be more important than the latter.35a (One may
wonder, though, about the relevance of interest in the
compensatory characteristics of the liability system given
the availability of private insurance and the possibility of
establishing social insurance programs.)
Concerning fairness, the principle that comes immediately
to mind is that a party ought not be punished for a harm
unless he did it, and--by extension--he ought not be punished
for a harm unless we are reasonably sure he did it. This
principle of fairness is in perfect accord with use of a
threshold probability criterion in the determination of
liability; on the other hand, the principle would be violated
by use of proportional liability, as a party would suffer
some sanction even when it was unlikely that he caused a
harm. Yet in assessing the importance of this consideration
favoring the threshold probability criterion, the analyst
should take into account two limiting factors. First, the
appeal of the principle seems strongest in the criminal
context, where actual punishment is meted out; in the civil
context, where the sanction is monetary and frequently paid
by a liability insurer, the significance of adherence to the
principle would seem diminished. Second, where the defendant
parties are not individuals but (large) firms, the importance
of the principle would also seem reduced.35
Finally, and closely related to the principle of fair-
ness, is the goal of minimizing the costs of error.36f36a
As Professor Kaye has recently shown, this goal implies the
superiority of the more-probable-than-not rule over propor-
tional liability.36b Now while normally one cannot object to
study of a particular social goal on logical grounds, in the
case of error minimization, one can. The objection is that
whereas one presumes that a social goal ought to be based on
immediate determinants of individual welfare,36C the goal of
error minimization is not; the goal is instead chiefly a
proxy for the undesireable effects on individual welfare due
to the consequences flowing from errors. It is these conse-
quences that primarily matter to individual welfare, one
supposes, and not the errors themselves. (It is whether an
individual is affected by a carcinogen produced by firms and,
if so, whether he is compensated that matters to an individual
one would think, and not whether any firm has to pay damages
when it was not the cause.) In strict logic, the only
reason to include error as a direct ingredient of social
welfare is a belief that error matters to individuals inde-
pendent of the consequences due to error; and to the extent
that this is thought significant, error should be introduced
as a, not the, determinant of social welfare. The reader
may tend to regard this distinction as over subtle, and
admittedly in many contexts it will not be of any real
importance; but it is sometimes of significance, and it does
explain why the criterion of minimizing errors can lead to
anomalies (such as that none of the firms producing the36
carcinogen should be liable since none is ever more-probably-
36d than-not the cause).37
Appendix
As the general model has been discussed in the text, we
will describe it here as briefly as possible.
(i) All outcomes are defined in terms of a single good
to be called "wealth".
(ii) Social welfare equals the expected value of the
sum of parties' wealth. (Equivalently, it will be seen to
equal the value of engaging in activities less, possibly,
the cost of care, and less expected accident losses.)
(iii) Parties are risk-neutral in wealth; they act so
as to maximize its expected value.
(iv) Accidents--events involving a loss of wealth--
occur with a probability depending on whether parties engage
in risky activities and, possibly, on whether they take
37 care.
(v) Each accident is caused by precisely one entity (a
party or a natural agent), that is, there is one and only
one entity for which the following statement is true: "The
accident would not have occurred in the absence of the
entity."
(vi) ,Then an accident occurs, there will be a chance
that the entity which caused it will not be known to the
court; such instances will be said to be of ambiguous origin;
but the conditional probability--the probability of
that the entity caused the accident will be determined by the
court.38
(vii) Twotypesof legal treatment of cases of ambiguous
origin will be investigated. The first involves the use of
an all-or-nothing criterion, a function (of variables to be
specified) determining whether the applicable liability rule
(strict liability or negligence) shall be employed. The
specific all-or-nothing criterion to which most attention
will be paid is the threshold probability criterion, under
which the applicable liability rule shall be employed if the
probability of causation exceeds the threshold probability.
The second type of treatment of ambiguous cases is to adopt
use of proportional liability: always to employ the applicable
liability rule, but to set the damages to be paid in the
event of liability equal to the accident loss multiplied by
the probability of causation.
We will now analyze versions of the general model
(those considered in the text), amplifying on or adding to
the assumptions just made as we proceed.
I.Uncertainty Over Causation: Party vs. Natural Agent
A.Basic model: party decides only whether to engage
in his activity
Define the following notation.
v =valueto the party of engaging in his activity; v
0;
p =probabilityof accidents caused by the party's
engaging in his activity;39
n =probabilityof accidents caused by the natural
agent; 0 <n<1;p +n 1;
£ =lossif accident occurs; £ >0.
As the events that an accident is caused by the party and by
the natural agent are mutually exclusive (assumption (v))1




If the party does not engage in his activity, then all
accidents are assumed to be known to be due to the natural
agent.38 But if the party does engage in his activity,
cases of ambiguous origin will arise, and to describe this,
define
=conditionalprobability that an accident caused by
the party appears to be of ambiguous origin; 0 <c
1;
=conditionalprobability that an accident caused by
the natural agent appears to be of ambiguous
origin; 0 < 1.
Hence, the probability of an accident known to be caused by
the party will be
(2) p(l —a);
the probability of an accident caused by the party but seen
as of ambiguous origin will be
(3) pa;
the probability of an accident knowii to be caused by the
natural agent will be40
(4) n(l —
andthe probability of an accident caused by the natural
agent but seen as of ambiguous origin will be
(5) '-'13.
Accordingly, the conditional probability that an accident of
ambiguous origin was caused by the party, that is, the
probability of causation, will be
(6) c =pci/(pc+n13).
39 We remark that c could equal any value in u,ij.
Let us assume that the applicable liability rule is
strict liability, according to which a party would simply be
liable for losses in the absence of uncertainty over causation.4°
Let us now examine the different ways of treating cases
of ambiguous origin. In doing this we assume that the court
knows (can "observe") the variables p, n, 2, ci, and 13, but
that it cannot observe v. However, we assume that the court
knows the probability distribution of v; let this be charac-
terized by
f(•) =probabilitydensity of the value v of engaging
in the activity; f is positive over [0, ]
andzero elsewhere; V> 2.
Let us consider first the threshold probability criterion,
where
t =thresholdprobability; 0 <t<1.
Under this criterion, in cases of ambiguous origin the party
will be liable and pay £ in damages when41
(7) c >t.
(If the party is knowntohave caused an accident, then of
course he also pays £ in damages.)41 Let us now prove
Proposition 1. Use of the threshold probability criterion
may lead to a socially undesirable outcome; the party might
undesirably fail to engage in his activity or might undesirably
engage in it.
42 Proof: If c >twould hold in ambiguous cases, the
party will be liable in all such cases. Thus, his expected
liability were he to engage in his activity would be43
(8) p(l—)2 +pc2+n2p2+fl2,
sothat he will engage in his activity if
(9) v >p2+n132.
Comparing this to (1), we see that the party will not engage
in his activity when it would be socially desirable that he
did if p2 <V < p2+n2..
On the other hand, if ct would hold in ambiguous
cases, then the party will never be liable in such cases, so
44 that his expected liability would be only
(10) p(l—c).Qp2 —pa.Q..
Hence, he will engage in the activity if
(11) v >p2—p2,
implying that he will engage in the activity when that would
be undesirable if p2 -pc2<v<p2.Q.E.D.4542
Next, let us consider the best all-or-nothing criterion
for determining liability in ambiguous cases. Under this
criterion, the court uses all the information at its dis-
posal--p, n, 2, c, f,andf(•)--and determines whether there
should be liability so as to maximize the expected value of
social welfare. Specifically, if the court would not hold
the party liable, then social welfare will be
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Note that the interpretation of the left-hand term in (14)
is the "opportunity loss" that would be due to socially
undesirable discouragement from the activity were there
liability in ambiguous cases; and the interpretation of the
right-hand term is the loss that would be due to socially
undesirable engagement in the activity were there were not
liability in ambiguous cases. Under the threshold probability
criterion, by contrast, it is the size of c =pc/(pc+n)
versus t that determines whether there is liability--and t
is presumed to be fixed, not to depend on 2, p, n, or other
variables.46 This suggests43
Proposition 2. The best all-or-nothing criterion is
not equivalent to (and thus is superior to) a threshold
probability criterion.
Note. The best all—or-nothing criterion may still lead
to both types of socially undesirable outcome as are possible
under a threshold probability criterion.
Proof: Assume that the best all-or-nothing criterion
is equivalent to a threshold probability criterion for some
t, say t', and consider for example a p, n, ci,andsuch that
c =pcx/(pci+n)>t'.Then the party would be liable under the
threshold criterion, but he might not be liable under the best
all-or-nothing criterion; for, clearly, (14) might not hold
(suppose that most of the probability mass of v is concentrated
in the interval (p2,p2 +n2)).Thus the assumption that the
criteria are equivalent is contradicted.47
Regarding the Note, it is obvious that both types of
problem are possible depending on p, n, 2, ci,, andf():
for if (14) holds, then the party might be undesirably
discouraged from engaging in the activity; and if (14) does
not hold, then the party might be undesirably encouraged to
engage in it. Q.E.D.
Last, let us consider proportional liability. Recall
that under this approach, the party would pay c2 in all
cases of ambiguous origin. We have
Proposition 3. Use of proportional liability leads to
a socially desirable outcome.44
Proof: If the party engages in his activity, his
expected liability will be
(15) p(l —a)2.+ (pci + n)c2. =p(l— +
(py + n)[pci/(pci + n)}2 = p2..
Hence, the party will engage in his activity when v > p2,
which is precisely the condition (1). Q.E.D.48
B. Extended model: party decides whether to engage
in his activity and, if so, whether to take care.
We will now consider the possibility that the party can
reduce the probability of an accident by taking care. To
this end, define
g =probabilityof accidents caused by the party's
activity if he takes care; 0 < q < p; and
x =costof taking care; 0 < x.
Hence, if the party engages in his activity, it will be
socially desirable for him to take care if
(16) q2. + x < p2.
Further, if (16) holds, then it will be socially desirable
for the party to engage in his activity if
(17) V > + x;
but if (16) does not hold, (1) will as before determine the
social desirability of his engaging in his activity. We
will assume that the same conditional probabilities a and
of accidents appearing ambiguous apply whether or not care
is taken.4945
Hence, if the party engages in his activity and takes care,
the probability of an accident known to be caused by him
will be
(18) q(l —
theprobability of an accident caused by him but seen as of
ambiguous origin will be
(19) q;
if the party does not take care, the analogous probabilities
wiii still be given by (2) and (3); and the analogous prob-
abilities of accidents caused by the natural agent will
still be given by (4) and (5). If the party takes care,
his probability of causation in cases of ambiguous origin
will be
(20) c =gu/(qc+nf3),
which, note, is lower than c will be if he does not take
care (as q <p).Let us now proceed with the analysis,
first assuming liability to be strict, and then to be based
on the negligence rule.
1. situation under strict liability
We have
Proposition 4. Use of the threshold probability criterion
may lead to a socially undesirable outcome. Specifically,
(a) the party might undesirably fail to engage in his
activity or might undesirably engage in it;
(b) if the party engages in his activity, he might
undesirably fail to take care or he might undesirably
take care.46
Note. Part (a) is true for essentially the reason that
Proposition 1 was true. With regard to (b), we will show
(i) that the party might undesirably fail to take care
precisely when ct whether or not care is taken; (ii) that
the party might undesirably take care precisely when ct
only if care is taken; and (iii) that the party will take
care if and only if that is desirable precisely when c >t
regardless of whether care is taken.
Proof:(a) We omit the argument for this part, as it
is analogous to that given in Proposition 1.
(b) Assume that the party is induced to engage in the
activity and consider in turn the three possibilities mentioned
in the Note.
(1) ct regardless of whether care is taken. In this case,
expected liability is p2 -pci2if care is not taken and q2 -
g2if it is, so that care will be taken if
(20) q2 —qc2 +x< p2 —pc2
or, equivalently, if
(20') q2 +x<p2—(p—q)c2.
Comparing this to (16) and noting that (p -q)c2>0,it is
evident that the party might undesirably fail to take care
(but would not undesirably take care).
(ii) ct only if care is taken. In this case, expected
liability is p2 +n2.if care is not taken and it is q2 -qc2




Comparing this to (16) and noting that (qc +n)2>0,it
is evident that the party might undesirably take care (but
would not undesirably fail to do so).
(iii) c >tregardless of whether care is taken. In this
case, expected liability is p2 +n2if care is not taken and





which is just (16), so that care will be taken if and only if
it is socially desirable. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5. The best all-or-nothing criterion is
not equivalent to (and thus is superior to) a threshold
probability criterion.
(The argument is analogous to that of Proposition 2 and
is therefore omitted.)
Proposition 6. Use of proportional liability
leads to a socially desirable outcome.
Proof. By the steps in (15), it is clear that if
the party engages in his activity and does not take care,
his expected liability will be p2.; and if he does take care,
it will be q2. Hence, if he engages in his activity, he will
take care if q2 +x<p2.But this is just (16), so that
his decision about care will be socially desirable. Further,
if he would wish to take care, then he will choose to engage48
in his activity when v >+ x;and if he would not wish to
take care, he will choose to engage in his activity when v >
p.But these conditions are just (17) and (1), so that the
party's decision whether to engage in the activity will also
be socially desirable. Q.E.D.
2. situation under the negligence rule
We will assume that a party would be found negligent if
and only if he undesirably failed to take care, that is, if
and only if he failed to take care when (16) held; thus, we
assume that when (16) does not hold, the party will never be
found negligent.50 If the party is found negligent, then
under the negligence rule, he will be liable for the loss he
has caused.
Let us review the properties of the negligence rule in
the absence of uncertainty over causation (so that we can
see what difference such uncertainty makes). Thus, let us
assume in this paragraph that an accident would be seen to
be caused by the party if and only if it truly was so caused.
Now suppose the party has decided to engage in the activity
and that the exercise of care is desirable. Then if the
party failed to take care, he would be liable for all accidents
he caused, implying that his expected liability would be p2;
but he would never be liable if he took care. Hence, he
will take care if x <p2.But, using (16),
(23) x <q2+x<p2,
so that the party will indeed take care. On the other hand,
if the exercise of care is not desirable, the party would49
never be found liable, so that he would not take care. We
have therefore shown that the party will be induced to take
care if and only if that would be desirable. However, the
party will be led to engage in the activity too often: If
taking care is desirable, then since he would be induced to
do so and would never be liable, the party would decide to
engage in the activity whenever
(24) v >x
rather than only when v >q2+x.And if taking care is not
desirable, since he would never be liable and would not take
care, he would engage in the activity whenever
(25) v >0
rather than only when v >p2.
With these facts in mind, let us proceed.
Proposition 7. Use of the threshold probability criterion
may lead to a socially undesirable outcome. Specifically,
(a) the problem of an excessive incentive to engage in
the activity may be exacerbated; and
(b) if the party engages in his activity, he might
undesirably fail to take care.
Note. The problem in (b) can arise only where ct if
care is not taken; and the problem in (a) can arise only
where the problem in (b) would arise.
Proof. (a) Suppose that the exercise of care would be
desirable if the party were to engage in his activity. Then
if the party would be induced to take care were he to engage
in his activity, he would decide to engage in it when v >
whichis just (24), so in this case the problem of excessive50
incentives to engage in the activity would not be worsened.
However, if the party would not be induced to take care were
he to engage in his activity, then (as will be explained in
the proof to (b)) he would engage in it whenever V> p2-
ap2;but since p2 -cp2<xin this case, the problem of an
excessive incentive to engage in his activity would be
worsened.
Now suppose that the exercise of care would be undesir-
able. Then the party would never be found negligent, so he
would engage in his activity if v >0,which is (25), meaning
that the problem of an excessive incentive to engage in his
activity would not be altered.
(b) Assume that the party is induced to engage in his
activity, that taking care is desirable, and consider the
following two possibilities.
(i) ct if care is not taken. The party's expected liability
will be p2 -cp2if he fails to take care and 0 if he takes
care. Hence he will take care if
(26) x <p2—cp2.
Comparing this to (16), it is evident that he might undesir-
ably fail to take care. (This can occur whenever g2 <cp2:
In that event, p2 -cp2<p2 -q2,so that p2 -ap2<x<
p2-q2is possible. But this means that (26) is not satis-
fied even though the exercise of care is desirable.)
(ii) c >tif care is not taken. In this case, the party's
expected liability will be p2 +n2if he fails to take care
and 0 if he takes care. Hence he will take care if51
(27) x <p+n132,
but this is clearly true, since q2. +xz p2.. Thus the party
will take care. Q.E.D.
Proposition 8. The best all-or-nothing criterion is
different from (and thus is superior to) a threshold proba-
bility criterion.
(The argument is omitted, as explained before.)
Proposition 9. Use of proportional liability results
in the same outcome that would be observed in the absence of
any uncertainty over causation.
Note. In other words, the decision regarding the
exercise of care will be socially desirable, but there will
be exactly the problem with excessive incentives to engage
in the activity as was described at the beginning of this
subsection.
Proof: From the steps in (15), it is clear that the
party's expected liability would be p2. if he failed to take
care and care was desirable. Thus, the party's situation is
precisely as initially described in this subsection, from
which the result follows. Q.E.D.
II. Uncertainty Over Causation: Which of Several Parties
Was The Author of Harm
We will assume here that there are only two parties, A
and B, who might cause accidents (and no natural agent).51
The situation regarding the occurrence of accidents and
whether they are seen as of ambiguous origin will be analogous52
to that in part I. However, here the analysis of legal
rules will be complicated by the fact that the effects of a
legal rule on parties' behavior are interrelated; for one
party's behavior may influence the other party's behavior by
altering the likelihood of his liability for ambiguous
cases. Let us note also that we will consider two possibilities
regarding the parties' relationship to each other: A and B
may act independently; or they may act in concert. If they
act independently, we will assume the outcome to be a (Nash)
equilibrium, a situation such that neither party would wish
to alter its behavior assuming the other's to be fixed. If
they act in concert, we will assume the outcome to be that
which results in the highest sum of A's and B's expected
values.
A.Basic model: parties decide only whether to
engage in their activities.
Letbe as before and define the following notation.
VA, VB
=valueto A and B respectively of engaging in
their activities; VA, VB > 0;
A' B =probabilityof accidents caused respectively
by A's and B's activities; A' B > 0; +
521.
Hence,it will be socially desirable for A to engage in his
activity if
(28)VA >
andforB to do so if53
(29) v3 > p32.
If only one of the parties engages in his activity, all
accidents will be assumed to be known to be caused by him.
But if both A and B engage in their activities, cases of
ambiguous origin may arise; specifically, let
a =probabilitythat an accident caused by A
appears to be of ambiguous origin; 0 < a 1;
=probabilitythat an accident caused by B
appears to be of ambiguous origin; 0 <.1.
Thus, if both A and B engage in their activities, the probabil-
ity of an accident known to be caused by A will be
(30) pA(l_a);
the probability of an accident caused by A but seenas of
ambiguous origin will be
(31) pAa;
and the analogous probabilities for B will be and






Assuming liability to be strict, let us first examine
the threshold probability criterion. Under this criterion,
the only statement to add from before byway of definition
is that if both parties are liable in an ambiguous case--that
is, if CA > t andcB > t —-then A will be supposed to bear a
fraction A of the loss and B, a fraction 1-A.54
Let us now prove
Proposition 10. Use of the threshold probability
criterion may lead to a socially undesirable outcome.
Specifically,
(a) if the parties act independently, then a party
might undesirably fail to engage in his activity or might
undesirably engage in it;
(b) if the parties act in concert and no party would be
liable for ambiguously caused accidents, then parties might
undesirably engage in their activities. However, if some
party (or parties) would be liable for all such accidents,
then parties will engage in their activities precisely when
that would be socially desirable.
Proof: (a) Suppose that VB > + As B would
then choose to engage in his activity even were he liable
for all accidents, he will definitely choose to engage in
his activity. Suppose as well that if A also were to engage
in his activity, then cA >tand CBt. Thus A's expected
liability were he to engage in his activity would be +
hewould thus do so only if VA > +B'and
comparing this to (28), it is clear that he might undesirably
fail to engage in his activity. Now suppose that if A were
to engage in his activity, then CAt and CB >t.Then A's
liability would be -A'he would thus engage in his
activity if VA > -A'and Comparing this to (28), it
is evident that he might undesirably engage in his activity.55
(b) If the parties act in concert, they will consider
four possible strategies--neither engages in his activity, A
alone does so, B alone does so, or both do so--and they will
choose that strategy with the highest sum of values net of
expected liability costs. Now if neither party engages in
his activity, the sum is 0. If A alone does so, it is
VA -A•If B alone engages in his activity, the sum is
VB - If both engage in their activities, the sum isVA
+ VB - + PBX) when one or both would be liable in
ambiguous cases, but the sum is onlyVA + VB - + -
+ when neither would be liable in ambiguous
cases. (Neither being liable is possible if t ￿ 1/2; suppose,
for instance, thatCA =CB
=1/2if both engage in their
activities..) Note that this statement is true regardless of
the fraction A paid by A if both happen to be liable in
ambiguous cases, for the sum of A's and B's liability in
such cases will be £ independent of A.
With this in mind, let us consider the parties' decision
assuming first that neither would be liable in ambiguous
cases. Then it is possible that both A and B would engage
in their activities when it is desirable for only one (or
neither) to engage in his activity. Suppose, for example,
that VA =2Aand VB = -B• On the other hand, it
is not possible that A or B would fail to engage in his
activity when that would be desirable. To show this, observe
that if it is desirable for A to engage in his activity, he
would certainly do so: for then if A alone engages in his56
activity, the sumVA
- will be positive; and the sum if
both A and B engage in their activities minus that if B
alone does so will beVA - + (pAcY + which is also
positive; hence either A alone will engage in his activity
or both A and B will do so. Similarly, if it is desirable
for B to engage in his activity, he would do so.
Now consider the possibility that one or both parties
would be liable in ambiguous cases. Then if it is socially
desirable for A alone to engage in his activity, this will
be the outcome: for if A alone engages in his activity, the
sum of parties' values net of liability costs will beVA -
>0; if B alone engages in his activity, the sum will be
VB -B2< 0; if both A and B do so, it will beVA + VB -
+ =
(VA
- + (vB -pQ)< VA -A2'hence the
sumwillbe highest if A alone engages in his activity.
Similarly, if it is desirable for B alone to engage in his
activity, this will occur. And if it is desirable for both
A and B to engage in their activities, this will be the
outcome: for then (VA + vB) - + p) will exceed both
VA - and VB - Q.E.D.
Proposition 11. The best all-or-nothing criterion is
different from (and thus is superior to) a threshold probability
criterion.
(The argument is omitted, as explained before.)
Proposition 12. Use of proportional liability leads to
a socially desirable outcome.57
Proof: Using the steps in (15), we know that A's
liability will be if he engages in his activity, regard-
less of whether B engages in his activity; and B's will
similarly be if he engages in his activity, regardless
of whether A does so. Hence, if the parties act independently,
A will engage in his activity if and only if vA > and B
will do so if and only ifVE >B2'so that their decisions
will be socially desirable. And if the parties act in
uLiueLL,LHJ.b di11 wiii e cxue.in. is, L.nesum OL Lrie
parties'positions will be VA -A2if A alone engages in
his activity, vB - if B alone does so, and VA +VB -
+ifboth do so. Hence, the argument given at the
end of the proof to Proposition 10 applies and shows that
the parties will always choose the socially desirable outcome.
Q.E.D.
B.Extended model: parties decide whether to engage
in their activities and, if so, whether to take care
Define
=probabilityof accidents caused respectively
by A's and by B's activity if care is taken;
0 << A'0 < <




The description of whether it is socially desirable for
parties to take care and to engage in their activities is
analogous to that given at the beginning of part lB of this
Appendix. We will assume that the conditional probabilities
andof accidents appearing ambiguous apply whenever both
parties engage in their activities and whether or not care is
taken. Hence, for example, A's probability of causation if
both he and B take care is CA =qcY/(qcY
+q);his probabil-
ity of causation if he takes care and B does not is CA =
+ and so forth.
Let us now proceed. As the proofs of Propositions will
be obvious by analogy to previous arguments but will be
tedious to set forth, we will merely indicate what are the
applicable previous arguments.
1.situation under strict liabiliy
Proposition 13. Use of the threshold probability
criterion may lead to a socially undesirable outcome.
Specifically,
(a) suppose that the parties act independently. Then
a party might undesirably fail to engage in his activity or
undesirably engage in it; and if both parties engage in
their activities, then a party might undesirably fail to
take care or undesirably take care.
(b) Suppose instead that the parties act in concert.
Then if no party would be liable in ambiguous cases, parties
might undesirably engage in their activities and if so, they59
might undesirably fail to take care.If, however, some
party (or parties) would be liable in ambiguous cases, the
outcome will be socially ideal.
Proof: (a) By analogy to the proofs to Propositions
4(a), (b) and 10(a).
(b) By analogy to the proofs to Propositions 4(a) and
(b) and 10(b).
Proposition 14. The best all-or--nothing criterion is
different from (and thus is superior to) a threshold proba-
bility criterion.
Proposition 15. Use of proportional liability leads to
the socially desirable outcome.
Proof: By analogy to the proofs to Propositions 6 and
12.
2. situation under the negligence rule
Proposition 16. Use of the threshold probability
criterion may lead to a socially undesirable outcome.
Speci fically,
(a) suppose that the parties act independently. Then
a party might undesirably fail to take care, and the problem
of an excessive incentive to engage in the activity may be
exacerbated.
(b) Suppose that the parties act in concert. Then if
no party would be liable in ambiguous cases, the problems in
(a) may arise.If, however, some party (or parties) would be
liable in ambiguous cases, the outcome will be the same one60
that would be observed in the absence of any uncertainty
over causation.
Proof: (a) By analogy to the proofs to Propositions
7(a), (b), and 10(a).
(b) By analogy to the proofs to Propositions 7(a), (b)
and 10(b).
Proposition 17. The best all-or-nothing criterion is
different from (and thus is superior to) a threshold probability
criterion.
Proposition 18. Use of proportional liability results
in the same outcome that would be observed in the absence of
uncertainty over causation.
Proof: By analogy to the proofs to Propositions 9 and
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1. "Accident" will refer to any instance in which harm is
done and (as the title of this article indicates) in
which the remedy sought by the injured party is money
damages. However, the area of law to which the analysis
will seem most naturally applicable is torts, for it is
here that problems of uncertainty over causation seem
most often to arise.
la. See generally the cases cited in William L. Prosser,
The Law of Torts (1971) at 241.
2. In regard to the restrictiveness of this measure of
social welfare and to (what will be seen to be) the
highly stylized nature of the model, the usual caution-
ary remark applies--that for a model to be tractable,
it must be highly stylized and the measure of social
welfare must be restrictive. The reader should there-2
fore not take statements of results obtained in the
model in anything like a direct way as recommendations
for policy or as explanations for observed fact.
Furthermore (see below), some attempt will be made
after the analysis of the model to say what is the
model's proper interpretation in view of the probable
importance of considerations going outside it.
2a. The conventional statistical and decision theoretic
meaning given to the word "expected" is probability-
discounted. Thus, expected liability is probability—
discounted liability; if, for instance, a party faces
liability of $1,000 with a probability of 5%, then his
expected liability is 5%x$1,000 or $50. See generally
Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis (1968).
3. See Prosser, supra note la, at 241.
3a. See the discussion of Example 3, infra.
3b. However, in the concluding comments, it will be suggested
that the appeal of the proportional approach may be
significantly limited by (among other reasons) its
being associated with higher administrative costs than
is the threshold probability criterion. See also notes
34 and 35, infra.3
3c. Point (i) concerning the possibility of a diminished or
of an extra burden of liability has been noted in much
recent writing on our subject. See for example Laurence H.
Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in
the Legal Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329 (1971) at
1350; Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law
(1977) at 430-433; David Kaye, the Limits of the Pre-
ponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked
Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, American
Bar Foundation Research J. 487 (1982); William M.
Landes and Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law:
An Economic Approach, University of Chicago Law School
(1982) at 21-24; Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation
and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9
Journal of Legal Studies 463 (1980) at 494; David M.
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure
Cases, Harvard Law School (in process); Charles Nesson,
Foundations of Judicial Proof, Harvard Law School,
(1982) at 68-75. Similarly, point (iii) on the desira-
bility of the proportional approach has occasionally
been noted. See for example Landes and Posner, Nesson,
and, especially, Rosenberg; and see also the references
mentioned in note 29 infra.
Thus, the contribution of this article does not
lie in any real novelty in respect to points (1) and
(iii). (To my knowledge, however, point (ii) has not
been previously stated.) Rather, it lies in the systematic4
development of the points, in the differences that are
shown to exist in their significance depending on the
situation under study, in the generality of the analysis,
and in the proofs of the Appendix (see below).
4. Suppose for instance that the loss of a barn could
either be caused by a fire set by lightning (the natural
agent) or else by one started by a party. What is of
analytical importance about such examples is that
liability does not affect the risk due to the natural
agent, or, more generally, that liability does not
affect the risk due to the cause alternative to the
party. Thus we will be able to interpret the model of
this part as applying not only when the alternative
cause is a natural agent, but also when it is associated
with human behavior that would not be (much) affected
by liability. (Hence, as we suggested, the model would
appear to apply to the situation involving the chemical
plant's emissions vs. normal exposure to carcinogenic
risks like medical x-radiation; for despite being the
outcome of human behavior (a decision whether to have
an x-ray at the dentist's), the magnitude of the latter
risks would not seem to be much influenced by the
particulars of liability law.)
5.The assumption that a loss could not be caused by both
the party and the natural agent (that the barn that5
burned due to the fire set by the party would not have
burned a little later due to a fire set by lightning,
or that the two fires would not have merged before
reaching the barn) is made only for simplicity. Were
the assumption relaxed, the results would remain essen-
tially unchanged; see notes 6 and 11, infra.
6. This example would have to be modified were we to relax
the assumption that accidents always have a single
cause. Suppose for instance that the risks due to the
natural agent and to the party are statistically inde-
pendent, so that were the party to engage in the activity,
30%xlO% =3%would be the risk of an accident due to
both causes (either cause alone being sufficient to
create the loss of 1,000). Then the increment in
expected accident losses due to the party would be only
27%; that is, it would be less than the 30% risk he
might be said to cause, and by the 3% risk of accidents
that would have occurred due to the natural agent in
any event. Thus it would be socially desirable for the
party to engage in his activity if his benefits would
exceed 270.
This general point applies not only when the loss
caused by the party would have occurred simultaneously
due to another agent, but also when the loss would have
occurred sometime later due to another agent (e.g.,
cancer due to a chemical contaminant might have occurred6
several years later due to medical x-radiation), or
when the loss masked or accentuated a loss that occurred
sometime earlier due to another agent (e.g., cancer due
to the individual's smoking habit and to medical x-radia-
tion is only diagnosed after, and is perhaps aggravated
by, his exposure to a chemical carcinogen).
7.This is the only form of liability that is studied in
the present version of the model, as there is no decision
about care and hence no meaningful interpretation of
negligence.
7a. In the model considered in this article there is only
one type of ambiguous case and hence only one possibile
level of the probability of causation. This means that
under the threshold probability criterion the party is
either liable in every ambiguous case or in none. In a
more general model with a multiplicity of types of
ambiguous case, of course, the party's probability of
causation might sometimes exceed the threshold and
sometimes not--so that he might be liable in some
ambiguous cases and not in others.
8.We will use this 50% threshold probability criterion in
succeeding examples as well, but the appendix considers
all possible thresholds.7
9.See (14) and Proposition 2 of the Appendix.
10. Suppose in Example 3 that thebestdecision is, say, to
find liability. Then those (presumably few) parties
with benefits between 300 and 350 would be undesirably
discouraged from engaging in the activity.
11. If we relax the assumption that accidents have a single
cause, the proportional approach will continue to
result in the level of expected liability that will
lead the party to decide in a socially desirable way
whether to engage in his activity. Suppose, for instance,
that there is a 3% risk of accidents due to both the
party and to the natural agent, as described in note 6,
supra; that 1% is the risk of such cases appearing
ambiguous; that 18% is the risk of accidents due to the
party alone appearing ambiguous (leaving a 9% risk of
accidents due to the party alone being correctly iden-
tified); and that 4% is the risk of accidents due to
the natural agent alone appearing ambiguous. Then, as
the party's probability of causation would be derived
by dividing the likelihood that he alone caused an
ambiguous case by the total likelihood of ambiguous
cases, it would be 18%/(l% +18%+4%)=78.26%.
Hence, the party's expected liability were he to engage
in the activity would be 23%x782.6 +9%xl000=270.
But this was explained in note 6 to be the increment in8
expected accident losses that would be created by the
party's engaging in his activity. Thus the party will
indeed be induced correctly to choose whether toengage
in his activity.
We shall not bother to make further comments in
notes showing our points to be unaffected by thepossi-
bility that accidents are due to more than one cause.
12. Specifically, if the party takescare, then the probabil-
ity of causation equals 2/3X28%/(2/3x28% +5%)=18.66%/
23.66%78.87%.
13. That is, 2/3X6%/(2/3x6% +5%)=44.44%.
14. Of course, and as mentioned, the incentive whetherto
engage in the activity may be appropriate.
15. This argument was originally elaborated in Steven
Shavell, Strict Liability vs. Negligence, 9 Journal of
Legal Studies 1 (1980). See also, William M. Landes
and Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of
Tort Law, 15 Georgia Law Review 851 (1981) at 904-916.
16. On the other hand, there can be no possibility of the
party's being undesirably discouraged from engaging in
the activity due to uncertainty over causation, for he
can always escape liability by taking due care. (However,9
this would not be true if the party could not be sure
of escaping liability by taking due care--because, say,
of the possibility of error in assessing whether he
took due care.)
17. This argument is developed in Steven Shavell, The Judg-
ment-Proof Problem, Harvard University (1983). Its
point can be easily appreciated by reconsidering the
situation where the cost of care is 10 and the exercise
of care would reduce the risk created by the party from
30% to 28%. If the party takes care, then under the
negligence rule his only costs would be 10, whereas if
he does not take care, his expected liability would be
300, which is a much larger quantity. Thus the party
would have to escape liability with very high probabil-
ity to make it worth his while to act negligently.
(For instance, even if he escaped liability 95/100 of
the time, his expected liability would be 15 were he
not to take care; since 15 is greater than 10, he would
still choose to take care.)
Under strict liability, by contrast, even a moderate
likelihood of escaping liablity would be enough to lead
the party not to take care. (If he escaped liability,
say, 2/3 of the time, his expected liability would fall
from 100 to 93.33 if he were to take care, so he would
not wish to do so).10
18. The activities of the parties might be imagined to be
of a similar type (e.g., each party might be a manufac-
turer of the same drug or of the same explosive), or
the activities of the parties might be thought to be
different (e.g., the doctor practicing surgery, the
nurse assisting him, the firm producing the medical
instrument). It will make no difference to the analysis
which of the two interpretations is made.
19. Of course, the very meaning of the proportional approach
is to apportion damages among parties in proportion to
their individual probabilities of causation.
Under the threshold probability criterion, the
possibility of apportionment also may arise. Suppose,
for instance, that the form of liability is the negli-
gence rule and that several negligent parties probabil-
ities of causation exceed the threshold. Then we might
have to contemplate the possibility of apportionment
among them. However, in the examples of this part of
the article, we will not have to do so; we will be able
to establish our results about the threshold criterion
(that it has various defects) without inquiring into
the effects of apportionment.
It should also be mentioned that under the more-
probable-than-not criterion, the issue of apportionment
can never arise, for it is impossible that more than
one party's probability of causation exceeds 50%; the
individual probabilities of causation must sum to 100%.20. This is the conventional characterization of the goal
pursued by parties who act in concert. The interpreta-
tion of the characterization is easily explained.
Suppose that the sum of parties' positions were not
maximized. Then it would be possible to make all
parties better off by choosing a strategy that increased
the sum and by making appropriate "side payments".
Suppose, for instance, that under one strategy, party
A's position is 5 and B's is 10, whereas under a second
strategy A's position is 3 and B's is 17. Then the
second strategy involves a higher sum (20 rather than
15) and, indeed, pursuing it allows both parties to be
made better off. For example, let B make a side payment
to A of 5--leaving B with 12, which exceeds 10, and
giving A 8, which exceeds 5. Such mutually beneficial
side payments are always possible when the sum of
parties' positions is increased.
21. Recall that in Example 12, A did not engage in his
activity because he would have borne an extra burden of
liability of 50. But here that does not matter because
the parties are envisioned to make side payments as if
to compensate for disadvantages suffered or advantages
gained. For instance, if B were to pay A 30 to engage
in his activity, A would be induced to do so, and B
would prefer this to engaging alone in his activity.
Specifically, A's position would be (325—350) +30=5,12
so he would be made better off, and B's net position
would become (125-50) -30=45,so he too would be
made better off.
22. While in Example 12, B also engaged in his activity
because he in effect fobbed off 50 of his expected
accident losses on A, here A would pay B not to engage
in his activity. If A paid B, say, 30 not to engage in
his activity, they would each be better off than if
each engaged in his activity: A's position would be
400—300—30 =70rather than 400 —350=50;B's posi-
tion would be 30 rather than 75-50 =25.
23. See Prosser, note la, supra at 241.
24. That is, given the occurrence of an accident, the
probability that there will be significant doubt about
its cause will usually be small. Given that my neigh-
bor's house burns down, the probability that there will
be substantial uncertainty whether the cause was the
fire I set to barbecue meat or one started by lightning
will be slight. Given that a pedestrian is run over,
the probability that there will be substantial uncer-
tainty whether the cause was my firm's truck or another's
will be negligible.13
25. If I believe that there will be no uncertainty over
causation and thus that I will face liability in the
great majority of instances in which I cause harm, I
will behave much as I would in the absence of the
possibility of uncertainty over causation, which is to
say that (other things equal) I will behave appropri-
ately. This intuitively obvious point should be clear
from our examples and discussion, and in any event,
will be immediately evident from our formal analysis.
(For example, as the probabilities a andthat an
accident caused by the party and by the natural agent
would be seen as ambiguous tend to 0, so will the
likelihood of socially undesirable behavior; see the
Appendix.)
26. Under the negligence rule, we showed that parties whose
anticipated probability of causation in ambiguous cases
would exceed the threshold will not take excessive
care; it is only that they will have a specially strong
motive to take due care. And we observed that although
parties whose probability of causation would be less
than the threshold might in theory fail to take due
care, this is not likely (refer to the discussion
following Example 9 and to note 17, supra).
27. See John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Fact Finding
Process, 20 Stanford Law Review 1065 (1968) at 1072.14
27a. This view is perhaps best expressed and its validity
most convincingly demonstrated in Wex Malone, Rumina-
tions on Cause-in-Fact, 9 Stanford Law Review 60 (1956).
See in particular Malone's discussion at 72-88 of
rescue of seamen, of escape from fire, of competing
causes and accidental shootings, and of medical mal-
practice.
28. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 119 P.2d 1 (1948). See
more generally Prosser, note la supra, at 243 and at
319; and see the discussion and citations in the articles
mentioned in note 29, infra.
29. We refer here to litigation over cancer caused by the
drug DES. (Millions of women used this drug during
their pregnancies; this has created the risk of an
often fatal cervical cancer in the women's prenatally
exposed daughters; and the women have typically found
it difficult or impossible to identify the producer
(out of several hundred firms) of the DES that they
purchased.) In an influential decision in the DES
litigation, Sindell V.AbbottLaboratories 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 607 P. 2d 924 (1980), the California Supreme
Court held that each defendant producer of the drug
should be liable according to its share of the market,
and thus ostensibly according to the probability that
it sold the drug that caused the plaintiff's injury.15
This decision has stimulated much interest not
only because of the importance of the DES litigation
itself, but also because of the larger issues involved.
See for example Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of
Enterprise Liability, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 963 (1978);
Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES
Causation Problem, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 668 (1981); Glen 0.
Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections
on the DES Cases, 68 Va. L. Rev. 713 (1982); Richard
Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-In-Fact
Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 Calif. L. Rev.
881 (1982); and David M. Rosenberg, note 3a, supra.
29a. For liability according to market share to be equal to
liability in proportion to the probability of causa-
tion, all firms' shares of the market must be taken
into account. Suppose that firms A, B, and C dominate
the market, each holding a 30% share, and that a "fringe"
of small firms sells to the remaining 10% of the market.
Then A, B, and C ought each to pay 30% of damages; it
would obviously be incorrect for each to have to pay
33.33% of damages; the fact that some in the fringe of
small firms may be judgment proof or defunct by the
time suit is brought ought not to alter the calculation
of A, B, and C's market shares.16
Additionally, for use of market shares to result
in liability in proportion to the probability of causa-
tion, the possibility that different firms' products
might present different risks must be considered. If
firm X and firm Y divide the market but firm Y's pro-
duct is twice as risky as firm X's, then the likelihood
that a loss of ambiguous origin was caused by firm Y is
clearly more than its 50% share of the market; the
likelihood is in fact 66.66% that Y caused the acci-
dent (for Y causes two accidents for every one which X
causes). More generally, suppose that n firms i1, .
nproduce a total output of N units; that the maker of
any particular unit cannot be identified; that s. is
the share of the market of firm 1; and that p. is the
probability of "failure" of a unit of firm i's. Then
if a unit fails, the likelihood that, say, firm jwas
n n
its maker equals p.sN/( p1s1N)p.57(1 p1s1).
1=1 J J1=1
n
(This may also be expressed as (p./p1)s/[s1 +I(p1/p1)s1J, 1=2
that is, one may use "weighted" market shares, where the
weights correspond to relative product risks.)
29b. In a case like Summers, however, the problematic effects
are only apparent; in point of fact, the adverse effects
on behavior of hunters of using the usual approach
would probably be negligible, for the likelihood of
several hunters' bullets simultaneously hitting another
must be small.17
30. For instance, in Summers the court said that the injured
party "has been placed ... inthe ... positionof
pointing to which ... defendant... causedthe harm.
If one [defendant] can escape, the othermay also and
plaintiff is remediless." And in Sindell, the court
said "In our contemporary ... society,advances in
science and technology create... goodswhich may
harm consumers and which cannot be traced toany speci-
fic producer ... [We]acknowledge that some adaptation
of the rules of causation and liabilitymay be appro-
priate in these recurring circumstances....The
manufacturer is in the best position to discover and
guard against defects in its products ... thushold-
ing it liable ... willprovide an incentive to product
safety."
31. The processes through which health-related and environ-
mental harms come about are often complex, imperfectly
understood, and of long duration. Thus, it indeed
seems plausible that firms creating the risk of such
harms may believe there is a substantial likelihood
that the injuries they cause could not easily be attri-
buted to them.
32. It is instructive to contrast the situation of a manu-
facturer of DES with respect to two types of risk:
that of a cancer such as the one actually caused by18
DES; and that of a company-owned truck running down a
pedestrian. As to the first type of risk, we have
suggested that a manufacturer might have thought the
likelihood of substantial uncertainty over causation to
be high; and thus we have suggested that the adverse
effect on the manufacturer's behavior of use of the
usual approach rather than the proportional might be
significant. But as to the second type of risk, the
likelihood of substantial uncertainty over causation is
undoubtedly small (as remarked in note 24, supra); and
thus there would be little reason to recommend replace-
ment of the usual approach.
32a. If the first type of error in use of market shares men-
tioned in note 29a supra, is made, it is clear that
dominant firms (A, B, and C of note 29a) will bear ex-
cessive liability, meaning that they might be led to
take excessive care or to decide against engaging in
their activity (production of the good). Conversely,
the fringe firms would bear too little liability, re-
sulting in the opposite problems.
If the second type of error in use of market
shares is made--that is, if market shares are not
adjusted in consideration of differences in product
risks--then a peculiar dilution of incentives to take
care will result. This is due to the fact that if a19
firm reduced its product risks and thereby expected
accident losses by some amount, its liability would
fall by only its market share times this amount. To
illustrate, suppose that liability is strict (a similar
(but more complex) argument can be made if liability is
based on the negligence rule); that firm F and firm G
each command half the market; that each causes $50,000
of losses, which cannot be directly attributed to it;
and that by taking care, F can reduce the losses it
causes to $25,000. Then if F takes care, its liability
would fall from 50%x$l00,000 =$50,000to 50%x$75,000 =
$37,500;thus F's liability falls by only $12,500, its
50% market share times $25,000. As a consequence, F's
incentive to take care is too small; F would decide to
take care only when the cost of care was less than
$12,500 rather than (as would be socially desirable)
whenever it was less than $25,000. By contrast, if the
market share calculation were adjusted (as described in
note 29a) to reflect alteration in product risk, F's
liability would fall to $25,000 if he took care; for as
he would then cause only 1/3 of the losses, his liability
would be 33.33%x$75,000 =$25,000;thus F's incentive
to take care would be appropriate.
To demonstrate this more generally, use the notation
from note 29a, and suppose that a firm's liability is
determined by its market shares and that liability is
strict (and that firms act independently of one another).20
Then if firm j can at a cost x reduce its product risk
from p3 to pa', its expected liability would fall from
s( P5±N) to s.(( p1s1N) +P'S3N);
thus its
1J liabilitywould fall by s(s(P_P')N). Hence firm j
would take care only when x was less than this amount.
But since s(-y)N is the actual decline in expected
losses associated with firm j's exercise of care, it
would be desirable that it take care whenever
Hence, any firm j will take care too infre-
quently (given the behavior of other firms). On the
other hand, if liability is determined by use of the
adjusted market shares, the incentive to take care will
be correct. In strict logic, we already know this to be
true, for use of the adjusted market shares results in
liability in proportion to the probability of causation
(and we knew that this creates appropriate incentives).
Nevertheless, let us directly verify the point. If the
firm takes care, its expected liability falls from
n n n
(p.s./ psN) =p.s.Nto (p.'s./((l p1s) +
i=l i=l J J 3 Jij
n
p.'s.))(l p1sN +p.'sN)=p.'s.N.Thus, its expected
33 3 3 :i3
liability falls by s(P_P')N and it will therefore
choose to take care if and only if that would be socially
desirable.
33. See generally Richard A. Posner, Chapter 2]. note 3a,
supra; John Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 221
Journal of Legal Studies 279 (1973); and Steven Shavell,
Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis
Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal
Costs, 11 Journal of Legal Studies, 55 (1982).
34. There is however, a competing consideration: if the
plaintiff party believes the probability of causation
to be above the threshold, although he would often find
it worthwhile to initiate legal action under the threshold
criterion, he might not under the proportional approach--
because his damages would be less than full damages.
This consideration seems less important than the one
mentioned in the text, for it is precisely when the
probability of causation exceeds the threshold that the
proportional approach does not reduce damages much
below the full amount.
A formal comparison of the incentive to bring suit
under the two approaches may be clarifying in this
regard. Let t be the threshold probability;c
be the
plaintiff's estimate of the probability of causation; 2
bethe dollar amount of his loss; and k be the cost to
the plaintiff of bringing suit. Then (i) ifc>t, the
following is true: under the threshold criterion, the
plaintiff would receive a judgment (or settlement) of
2, so will bring suit if £>k; under the proportional
approach, he would receive c2 so he will bring suit
if cQ>k; hence the plaintiff will bring suit under the
threshold criterion but not under the proportional22
approach if .>k>c2. (ii) On the other hand ifct,
then the situation is simply that the plaintiff will
never bring suit under the threshold criterion but will
do so under the proportional approach if
ct>k.
Thus, (iii) the claim that suit is more likely under
the proportional approach amounts to a claim that it is
more likely that c1t andc2>k than it is that c>t
and yet £>k>c £.
35.To make this argument precise, let us assume that the
plaintiff has brought suit and that he and the defendant
will go to trial if and only if there does not exista
settlement amount which each would find preferable to
going to trial. Equivalently, they will go to trial
when the plaintiff's opinion of the judgment amount
exceeds the defendant's by more than the sum of the
trial costs that they would bear. Thus, tocompare the
propensity to go to trial under the two approaches, we
must compare the difference between plaintiff's and the
defendant's opinions of the judgment amounts under the
two approaches.
To this end, let t, £,andc
be as in note 34,
supra; let Cd be the defendant's estimate of the proba-
bility of causation; and let k and kd be respectively
the plaintiff's and the defendant's costs of going on
to trial. Now let us consider three possible relation-
ships that may exist betweenc and Cd:(i) both c23
and Cd exceed t. In this case, under the threshold
probability Criterion, there will always be a settlement,
for both parties will believe the judgment to be the
same; divergence of opinion about c and Cd will not
matter since both are above t. However, under the
proportional approach, there might be a trial: if the
plaintiff's estimate of the probability of causation
exceeds the defendant's by enough, this will be true;
if c 2 -c£>k +k,therewill be a trial.(ii) c pd p d p
exceeds t but Cd does not. Here, under the threshold
probability criterion, there might well be a trial, for
the plaintiff will expect to win 2 but the defendant
will expect to pay nothing; in particular, there will
be a trial if 2> k +kd.Under the proportional
approach, there might also be a trial; this would be so
when c2 -cd2>k+kd. But since 2>c2 -Cc2l there
would be a trial more often under the threshold cr1-
tenon. (iii) c does not exceed t. In this case,
under the threshold probability criterion, there will
never be a trial, for the plaintiff would not expect
any judgment. But under the proportional approach,
there might be a trial; and this will again be true if
C2 -Cd2>k+kd.
The implication of the preceding is this. In
cases (i) and (iii)-- whenever the plaintiff's and the
defendant's estimates of the probability of causation
exceed the threshold or whenever the plaintiff's falls24
below it--there will be a settlement under the threshold
probability criterion but there might be a trial under
the proportional approach. Only in case (ii)--only
when it happens that the plaintiff's estimate of the
probability lies above the threshold and the defendant's
lies below the threshold is it true that there is a
greater likelihood of a trial under the threshold
probability criterion than under the proportional
approach. On balance, then, the suspicion is that the
chance of litigation conditional on suit having been
brought is greater under the proportional approach than
under the threshold probability criterion.
35a. Equivalently, parties may generally desire to raise the
likelihood of positive compensation by giving up full
compensation in some circumstances. Arid this is an
implication of the economic theory of risk aversion and
insurance. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Essays in
the Theory of Risk-Bearing (1971).
36. For recent discussions of minimization of error and the
more-probable-than-not rule, see David Kaye, note 3a,
supra, and James Brook, Inevitable Errors: The Pre-
ponderance of the Evidence Standard in Civil Litigation,
18 Tulsa Law Journal 79 (1982).25
36a. The goal of error minimization seemsclosely related to
principle of fairness just discussed because a high
cost of error in punishing an innocent party implies
that one would not wish to impose punishment unlessthe
likelihood of guilt was great.
36b. Specifically, assuming the goal to be the minimization
of error Costs measured in dollar terms--that is, the
number of dollars erroneously awarded plus the number
of dollars erroneously not awarded-—Kaye, note3a, supra,
showed the superiority of the more-probable-than-not
rule over all possible alternative rules, and thus
in particular over proportional liability.(Kaplan,
note 27, supra, had earlier proved (under thesame
assumption) the superiority of the more-probable-than-not
rule over only other probability thresholds.) The idea
behind Kaye's argument (which he makesformally) showing
the superiority of the more-probable-than-not ruleover
proportional liability is simple. It is that if we
know that a defendant is more-likely-than-not thecause
of harm, then on average we will do best to make him
pay; to make him pay only in proportion to his probabi-
lity of causation would be to fail to insist that he
pay some dollars which we know on average it is best to
have him pay. And conversely, if we know thata defendant
1Smore-likely-than_notinnocent of having done harm,
then on average we will do best to let himgo; to make26
him pay at all, or in proportion to his probability of
causation, is to insist that he pay dollars that on
average will have been paid by innocent parties.
Suppose for instance that there are 100 cases, in each
of which the defendant is believed to have been the
cause with probability 60%; that in 60 of these cases,
defendants truly caused harm; that in 40 of these, they
did not; and that the amount of harm in each instance
is $1,000. Then under the more-probable-than-not
criterion, each defendant would pay $1,000; thus in 60
cases, no errors will have been made; in 40 cases,
$1,000 will have been erroneously paid; hence the total
error in dollars will be $40,000. By contrast, under
the proportional approach, each defendant would pay
$600; thus in 60 cases S400 will erroneously fail to be
paid; in 40 cases, $600 will erroneously be paid; hence
the total error in dollars will be $48,000--a higher
error than under the more-probable-than-not criterion.
In point of fact, Kaye's result can be strengthened.
It turns out that whatever are the weights attaching to
the two types of error--the dollars erroneously paid,
and the dollars erroneously not paid--some threshold
probability criterion (generally different from 50%)
will be superior to proportional liability. (In
Kaye'scase, the weights attaching to thetwotypes of
error were equal.)
To demonstrate this, let w1 be the weight multi-
plying errors of the first type; let w2 be the weight27
multiplying errors of the second; let p be the party's
probability of causation; and let 2. be the loss suffered.
Then if the party pays 2. in damages, the expected error
cost in (l-p)w12., and if he does not pay anything in
damages, the expected error cost is pw22. Hence, the
expected error minimizing all-or—nothing rule is to
make a party pay £ whenever (l-p)w12. <pw2.,or equiva-
lently, whenever p >w1/(w1
+w2),which is a probability
threshold criterion. (Note that this formula implies
that when the weights are equal, the threshold is 50%,
that when w1, the weight of the first type of error
(innocents' paying damages) is larger than w2, the
threshold exceeds 50%, etc.) Under proportional lia-
bility, expected error costs are higher. Since under
this approach the party pays p2 whatever is p, expected
error costs are (l-p)w1p2 +pw2(2.-p2).These expected
error costs exceed the error costs under the optimal




?.min[(l-p)w12,pw22] =errorcosts with a probability
threshold of w1/(w1 +w2),and note that the inequality
is strict so long as p is positive, unequal to the
threshold, and less than 1.
36c. More precisely, and in the language of welfare economics,
the ranking of social states ought to be a function of
individuals' rankings (equivalently, the social welfare28
function ought to have as its arguments individuals'
utilities). See for example Paul A. Samuelson, Founda-
tions of Economic Analysis (1947), and Kenneth J.
Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (1963).
36d. To repeat what has been said in slightly different
terms, this anomaly arises because the cost of error
criterion does not recognize the particular nature of
the consequences due to allowing firms to go free (a
high level of carcinogens, no compensation of victims).
But any measure of social welfare which is defined in
terms of the consequences must obviously recognize them.
37. The decisions whether to engage in activities and over
care will be discrete. However the qualitative nature
of our results would not be altered were we to have
studied a model with the levels of activities and/or
the levels of care continuously variable; see notes 45
and 48, infra.
37a. If (1) holds with equality, society will, of course, be
indifferent about whether the party engages in his
activity; for ease of exposition we will not comment
hereafter in the Appendix on possibilities of indiffer-
ence.
38. This assumption will be maintained in the other ver-
sions of the model.29
39. This is obvious. Suppose, for instance, that p=n.
Then c reduces to a/(a +), whichcan clearly range
over (0,1).
40. As remarked in note 7 supra, the negligence rule cannot
be studied in the basic model because there is no
variable interpretable as care. Moreover, as the court
cannot observe v (see following paragraph of the text),
it cannot, for instance, determine if v<p and if so
call a party "negligent" for having engaged in his
activity.
41. This can be regarded as an implication of the criterion,
for then c =1>t.
42. This is possible since we noted that c could range over
(0,1). (Hereafter, we will not bother to observe that
various inequalities are possible, as this will be
obvious.)
43. Note that n2 is what we earlier called his extra
burden of liability.
44. Note that pa2 is what we called the reduction in his
burden.30
45. If the level of activity were continuously variable,
Proposition 1 would still hold. We sketch the situa-
tion in this event. Let z be the level of activity,
v(z) be its value (where v'(z) >0,v''(z) <0),and
zp be the associated level of expected accident losses.
Then social welfare is given by v(z) -zpand the
socially desirable level of activity, say z*, is deter-
mined by v'(z)p2. Now the probability of causation c
is given by C= c(z)=zpc/(zpci+np),which is increas-
ing in z. Let be the z such that c(z) =t;thus c(z) <
tfor z <z.and c(z) >tfor z >z.(If C> tfor all
z >0,define z. =0;if c <tfor all z >0,define z. =
Hence,the party's choice of z will be determined by
max (max zp2 -zpa2,max zp2 +np).From these facts
zzt z>zt
the following may easily be established: If z* <
thenthe chosen z will be in between z and zt;
particular, z will be higher than is desirable. If
z* >z,then there are two possibilities. One is that
the chosen z z, in which case z =z*;but the other
is that the chosen zz., in which case z =z.and is
thus below the socially desirable level. Hence Propo-
sition 1 is indeed true.
46. Were the threshold allowed to vary with p, n, 2, a, f,
andf(•), then, trivially, the court could alter the
threshold so as to achieve exactly the result under the
best all-or-nothing criterion. (The court would merely31
choose any t <cwhen (14) holds, and it would choose
any tc when (14) does not hold.) But it does not
seem natural to interpret such a variable probability
threshold--one which is in effect the more complicated
criterion of (14)--as a threshold probability criterion.
47. A similar contradiction could be established were ct'.
48.In the continuous case, proportional liability also
results in a socially desirable outcome (as it will in
the continuous case of subsequent versions of the
model). Referring to the description of the continuous
case in note 45, supra, we see from the steps used in
(15) that the party's expected liability will equal
zp, so that he will maximize v(z) -zp.and thus
* selectz ,thesocially desirable z.
49. This seems the most natural assumption, but others are
plausible. (For instance, taking care might alter the
nature of accidents in such a way as to make them less
easily confused with those caused by the natural agent;
thus a and might fall if care were taken.) It will
be clear that our analysis could easily be modified to
take into account such possibilities and that this
could change some of our results (in the main, it could
alter the nature of the departure from the socially
desirable outcome under the threshold probability
criterion), but we shall not discuss this matter.32
50. We assume that there are no errors in observing x or in
determining whether (16) holds.
51. It will be obvious how to extend the arguments to the
case with three or more parties and/or with a natural
agent, but it would be cumbersome to do so.
52. Analogous to the situation in part I, the event that A
causes an accident and the event that B causes an
accident will be assumed mutually exclusive, etc.
53. In this case, it is desirable for A alone to engage in
his activity, yet if both engage in their activities,
the sum of their positions will be + - -
+ -
(PAa
+)) = +pAc,whichis posi-
tive, greater than what would be received if A alone were
to engage in his activity (namely A' and greater than
what would be received if B alone were to engage in his
activity (namely, Thus both A and B will engage
in their activities.